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1INTRODUCTORY ESSAY
THEOLOGY OF CULTURE, SECULARITY, AND PLURALITY 
Wessel Stoker 
Crossroad Discourses between Christianity and Culture explores the place of 
the Christian faith in contemporary (post)modern culture and looks at its 
dialogue with secular culture, the world religions, and new forms of 
religiosity, and at the internal dialogue between different Christian 
confessions. Contemporary Western culture is secular and pluralistic with 
respect to worldviews, and a tendency toward globalization can also be 
noted. What do these cultural changes entail for the Christian faith? In this 
introductory article I will make some comments from the perspectives of 
theology and philosophy of culture, thus outlining a framework for the 
contributions in Crossroad Discourses. I will do that by means of three key 
terms: the theology of culture, secularity, and plurality.     
Theology of Culture: A Worldview A Priori
An important concept in Abraham Kuyper, the father of the Neo-Calvinist 
movement in the Netherlands, is the idea of the "sphere sovereignty" in 
societal areas like education, art, church, etc., as Van der Kooi1 shows. 
Kuyper thus acknowledges the separation of church and state: wherever the 
separation between church and state exists, the church no longer enjoys any 
pride of place and all religions are to be treated equally by the government. 
Kuyper’s idea of “sphere sovereignty” in society can serve as a framework for 
the interaction of Christianity with secular culture and other religions. For 
this dialogue, the idea of “sphere sovereignty” entails, namely, that all 
parties are equal. This is a necessary condition for dialogue without 
compulsion or pressure by one of the dialogue partners. It is not, however, a 
sufficient condition, for one could ask why church and politics, faith and 
science should have something to say to each other. Is there a point of 
contact for such a discussion? 
Karl Barth does not provide us with such a point of contact. Van der 
Kooi points out that the early Barth severed the connection between
Christian faith and Western culture, albeit Barth did not thereby signify that 
the Christian had no responsibility toward society. To the contrary, Barth's 
role in the struggle of the German churches shows impressively how 
Christian theology unmasked the ideology of Nazism. Paul Tillich, Barth’s 
ally against liberal theology, held that the early Barth lacked a theology of 
culture (Tillich 1987: 91-116). He did not find this gulf between faith and 
culture acceptable and developed a theology of culture himself in which he 
demonstrated how religion is the soul of culture (Tillich 1990: 69-85). Is 
Tillich's concept of religion a point of contact for the current dialogue of faith 
with culture?  
                                               
1 The names in cursief refer to contributors to this volume.
2Tillich views religion as an indication for absolute meaning, for the 
unconditional that is present in society via values like the meaning of life, 
the good, the just, the true, the beautiful and personal life in love. The 
individual thus has an understanding of the unconditional; a religious a 
priori is part of being human. By referring to this unconditional in different 
areas of culture, Tillich is able to relate religion (as the experience of the 
unconditional) to culture. Religion is the substance of culture, and culture is 
the form of religion (Tillich 1967: 84). Tillich thus provides a point of contact 
for a dialogue between theology and culture. Christian theologians explain 
the ultimate meaning that people experience as the unconditional, as the 
God of the Bible: “God is the concrete, symbolic, religious expression of the 
unconditional. Of course, only religiously minded people will call such an 
unconditional their God” (Richard 2007: 210). 
With his broad concept of religion (religion as orientation toward the 
unconditional) Tillich wants to demonstrate that religion is not a separate 
area in culture but a dimension that is part of all areas of human life. I 
share his intention but disagree with how he elaborated on it. I will make 
two remarks regarding this with a view to a cultural-theological framework 
for the contributions in Crossroad Discourses. 
In his theology of culture Tillich makes use of the metaphysical view of 
meaning. An experience of meaning invokes a chain of increasingly larger 
contexts until one finally arrives at absolute meaning as the end and final 
justification for experiencing meaning. The “unconditional” is derived from a
metaphysics in which a value like the existential meaning of life is based on 
a final ground in an unconditional meaning (Stoker 1996: 70-90). That is a
kind of foundationalism that is criticized today by philosophical thinkers as 
divergent as Heidegger, Plantinga and Derrida. My next point is very much in 
line with this critique. This view of meaning as a chain of meaning with 
absolute meaning as the end does not do enough justice to non-religious 
people. Tillich leaves hardly any room in a secular culture for an experience 
of meaning that for certain people does not refer to the source of ultimate 
meaning, God. 
In what follows I will point to a hermeneutics of finitude as an 
alternative for foundationalism. Here I will provide an alternative to Tillich’s 
concept of religion in order to find common ground for dialogue between the 
Christian faith and secular culture as we find in the first part of this volume.
Every person has a life orientation, has to be a human being. Life is a 
matter of understanding (verstehen) people, things, and situations. It is not 
the unconditional that is part of being human but the appropriation of a life 
orientation. I call that an existential of being human: a property that each 
person should realize. I thus point on the one hand to the structure of being 
human and on the other to the way in which this existential is given 
worldview form, as a fragmented worldview, as a secular worldview such as 
humanism, as an organized religion or as a form of new spirituality outside 
of religious traditions (Stoker 2004: 115-18). This does justice to secularity,
and a dialogue between Christianity and secular culture can be carried out.
In short, a worldview a priori or life orientation is part of being human 
and can serve as common ground in the dialogue with culture: every person 
has, in one way or another, a life orientation and views certain norms and 
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something to say to one another.
The contributions in this volume can be read on the basis of these two ideas 
of the theology of culture.
The first is Kuyper’s (and Tillich’s) acknowledgement of a secular culture and 
of the separation of church and state. A culture led by the church, as
occurred in premodern society, is to be rejected. De Villiers shows that such 
a premodern society was more or less present in South Africa before 
apartheid. Van Bijlert explores tensions in India with respect to religion and 
the secular state in connection with the Dalits. Hinduism holds to a 
religious, hierarchical world order in which the Untouchables are rejected 
and their opportunities strongly limited. That clashes with the secular state 
that India is and is, moreover, at odds with human rights. It is necessary, 
therefore, according to Van Bijlert, to defend the democratic, secular 
constitution of India. 
The different spheres of society have independence from the church 
and state and thus the church should not interfere in them. Woldring shows 
how the state needs to promote social cohesion but also to respect the 
independent spheres of society. Thus, Woldring writes that it is the political 
task of the state “to help each person conquer his ‘freedom of expansion and 
autonomy’ progressively in a positive manner” (***). One of the phenomena of 
a multicultural society to attract interest is the populism that we usually 
connect with extreme-right political parties. Buijs clarifies the term populism 
and shows that it has more nuances than is usually acknowledged.  
Second, because the development of a life orientation is part of being 
human, there can be a fruitful dialogue on the question of how a life 
orientation can best acquire content through certain values in the public 
sphere or in a certain political or worldview conviction. Some contributors 
see the basic givens in culture as a “point of contact” for the dialogue 
between religion and culture. Kuipers demonstrates that Hannah Arendt’s 
amor mundi can also be used in public theology. Van Prooijen shows that 
“equality” in the public sphere can be enriched by the biblical concept of 
justice. Ward shows that there is overlapping and difference between “faith” 
in natural science and the Christian faith. Berendsen  searches for the 
connection between art and religion and makes clear what themes in art can 
mean for religion, whereas Jansen investigates what kind of language can be 
the bearer of spiritual values. He wants to go further than the well-known 
discussion on the similarity between religious language and poetic language. 
He investigates the spiritual values that can lie in the language of each 
written work and may or may not evoke transcendence of sorts.
The secular givens cited above―amor mundi, equality, faith, themes in 
art, and language as a possible bearer of spiritual transcendence―are 
important for the Christian faith because they can be related in one way or 
another to that faith, and sometimes, conversely, biblical concepts can 
fructify secular ideas so that there is an interchange between culture and 
the Christian faith. That is somewhat different, Minnema argues, in 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet. He claims that early modern virtues like Hamlet’s 
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providence with secular views of fate.  
Common ground can be sought in interreligious dialogue as well. May
does that in dialogue with Buddhism. He points to difference and 
overlapping between the Buddhist notion of compassion and the Christian 
notion of love and maintains that, via a phenomenology of sympathy and 
empathy, he has found a common ground for a global ethics. 
It could be wondered what kind of concept of culture is presupposed in this 
volume. Are we talking here about high culture, about the dialogue with art 
and science? And is the concern in interreligious dialogue only that of an 
intellectual dialogue between academically trained experts? That is not the 
case in this volume. Crossroad Discourses views culture more broadly than 
simply high culture: culture is not only a matter of the mind but also of the 
body. From the point of view of biblical anthropology, the human being is, 
after all, a unity of body, spirit and heart. Biblical peace, shalom, is a matter 
that concerns the whole person. Culture can be viewed as “any conversion of 
raw nature into a habitable world through the exercise of human labor and 
attention” (Cobb 2005: 41; quoted in Chun 2008: 168). The concern here is 
thus to give shape to material existence. Houtepen and Newlands show that 
the churches are also occupied with social problems, including religious 
violence. Gort supplies a Christian view of the issue of poverty. Brinkman
also pays attention to popular culture when he looks at the influence of 
popular religiosity on the image of Jesus in Latin America.
A theology of culture clarifies the intertwinement of religion and culture. 
Everybody needs a worldview orientation, and that is also why religion is 
important for a culture that has become secular. A philosophy of culture
approach can indicate further what secularity means for the place of the 
Christian faith.
Secularity: The Immanent Frame
Droogers shows the consequences of the modernization of Western society 
for religion. Modern culture is characterized primarily by
secularization/secularity, plurality and globalization. Here I will discuss 
secularization/secularity and globalization. In the next section I will explore 
plurality further in connection with interreligious dialogue. 
Droogers points out that the term secularization (viewed as a social 
process) refers primarily to de-churchification and is less connected to the 
idea that religion will eventually disappear. Religion is not disappearing but 
is shifting more from institutional religion to spirituality that thrives outside
religious institutions. Charles Taylor has explored the depths of secularity in 
his A Secular Age, and what he has to say about it clarifies the background 
of different contributions in this volume.  
Taylor distinguishes three meanings of the term secularity (viewed as 
the result of a process of secularization) (Taylor 2007: 2-4, 12-15). 
Secularity 1 refers to the disappearance of religion from the public sphere, 
i.e. social, economic and political life. Van Aarsbergen explores a problem in 
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responsible business practices. On the one hand, morality is often connected 
with religion, but how is a company to make choices here if religion has 
disappeared from the public sphere? 
Secularity 2 concerns the decrease (in a quantitative sense) of beliefs or 
religious practices. The question then is how traditional churches can 
respond to this. Unfortunately, many in the church do not comment on this 
form of secularization, and thus an answer has not been forthcoming. One 
can point out, for example, that there is now more openness in the 
Protestant Church in the Netherlands for the Pentecostal movement, which 
carries a strong attraction for many, and in some cases also for so-called 
modern spirituality and approaches to faith like the prosperity gospel.
Interest in esotericism has also grown. Kranenborg discusses the changed 
position of the church with respect to esotericism. Orthodox Christianity did 
not respond to esotericism for a long time, but interest esotericism is 
increasing, within the church as well. In a challenge to the church, 
Kranenborg asks if we can speak here of a new contextual theology. 
Secularity 3 arises when our secularized era is investigated with a view 
to the question of the cultural conditions under which people believe now in 
comparison to earlier periods. This meaning concerns understanding the 
conditions of modern culture on the basis of which people make or do not 
make a choice for a religion or for a secular worldview. Let us look at this 
form in more detail.   
Taylor sketches the development from an enchanted to an 
unenchanted world. In the premodern period the human self was porous and 
came into contact with spirit and demons. The human being lived in an 
enchanted world. Slowly, the “buffered self” arose, a human self that 
delimited itself from evil influences from outside (Taylor 2007: 37-42). In 
Christianity the accent began to lie more on the internal side of the human 
being and on self-discipline through spiritual exercises.  
In the Middle Ages the social order was a matter of (Platonic) "forms" 
that were anchored in reality as “essences.” In the natural-law thinking of
Hugo de Groot (1583-1645) and John Locke (1632-1704) the social order 
was seen as a human construction (Taylor 2007: 125-30). This did not in 
general deny any reference to God, but over time natural law was explained 
in an immanent way and the concept of a moral order without God arose.
With respect to time, a distinction was made in the premodern era 
between sacred and profane time. Violence within society was channeled 
through carnivals, allowing a time of “misrule” and a time of restoration of 
order. That distinction disappeared when the connection between religion 
and the social order became looser. Time became purely secular time, 
homogenous, empty time (Taylor 2007: 54-59, 129). 
Because of the changed view of the human self, of the social order and 
of time, since the end of the eighteenth century there have been secular 
worldviews existing alongside organized religion. Religion is no longer self-
evident in contemporary Western society but we live in a secular era. It 
would be wrong to argue that secularity means that the secular worldview is 
the only option and that religions, because of developments in the modern 
period, are passé. People did argue, after all, that secularization entailed the 
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that a “secular age” assumes that there is only one option: the secular one. 
That is incorrect and, to show that, he argues that a secular age does not 
mean that there is only one option, the secular, but that we, secular or 
religious, share an immanent framework. It is the context within which we 
make the choice to believe or not. The changed human self, the changed 
social order, and time as secular time gave rise to an immanent frame in 
society. Taylors describes it as follows:
So the buffered identity of the disciplined individual moves in a 
constructed social space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, 
and time is pervasively secular. All of this makes up what I call the 
“immanent frame.” (Taylor 2007: 542; cf. also 566)  
What is now called the immanent frame was originally the "natural" order in 
contrast to the “supernatural order.” The Reformation also distinguished the 
order of grace from the order of nature, but this order of nature has now 
become the immanent frame through which we stamp our time as secular. 
The immanent frame is the context in which we choose and develop our 
belief, and that can be a choice for a secular or religious worldview. This
immanent frame is merely the context for believing in a religious sense or 
not, and that is something different from choosing a worldview with respect 
to substance. 
It comes down to the question if this immanent frame is to be 
considered closed or open to religious transcendence. Atheists consider the 
immanent frame closed and develop a worldview choice for a closed world 
structure. It is assumed that science has demonstrated that God does not 
exist, or it is claimed, via a reductionistic theory of religion, that the function 
of religion has been taken over by something else (e.g. science) or that values 
can be authorized by the autonomous self. As we saw, the immanent frame 
is also the starting point for the believer, but in this case it is interpreted as 
being open to transcendence.
In addition to the immanent frame of contemporary secular culture, I 
would like to point to the changed view of rationality as well, which has 
consequences for the way in which people account for faith. The view of 
rationality has changed in the twentieth century. From the Enlightenment 
up until halfway through the twentieth century, the time in which logical 
positivism was prevalent, a concept of universal reason was endorsed and it 
was believed that an absolute foundation for knowledge existed. But we have 
been driven from that Garden of Eden of sharing God’s point of view. We 
have no absolute knowledge, and that includes religion. The strong view of 
rationality has given way to a weaker view. Does this then entail relativism in 
the area of worldviews? No, the false dilemma of all or nothing should be 
avoided. People are finite and that means that their claims to knowledge are 
not absolute but limited. Many questions in life appear to be a matter of 
probability.
Some of the contributions in this volume can be placed against this
background of epistemology and philosophy of culture.
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religion. In his contribution on China and the Christian West he points out 
that, for Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Leibniz (1646-1714) natural theology 
was still the common ground for the relationship between Christianity and 
Confucianism. Such a natural theology that arrives at God through shared 
reason has now become impossible. The order of nature has become, as we 
saw, an immanent frame, and the cultural differences are now being 
emphasized more. Griffioen indicates new ways to present the Christian faith 
in a non-Western culture. Koster considers the immanent frame open to
religious transcendence but no longer speaks of a rational justification for 
faith. He only wants to show the credibility of religious practices. 
One can ask if globalization, the process whereby the world is 
experienced as one global village, does not impose a tight pattern on the 
different cultures. Van de Merwe explores this and argues that globalization 
produces not cultural homogeneity but multiculturalism. In a descriptive 
sense, the term entails that there are cultural differences and that we should 
not level them. Multiculturalism should not be understood as cultures that 
exist alongside one another but as a condition for cultural differences. 
Houtepen gives an example of multiculturalism and demonstrates that in the 
West multiculturalism has influenced the rise of a wider ecumenism of the 
three Abrahamitic religions―Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. But there can 
also be a different response to globalization, as Wijssen shows in discussing 
a reactionary African response to globalization. Does the immanent frame 
that is more or less self-evident in the West also obtain for Africa? Some 
political leaders in Africa deny that and want to return to a time before the 
immanent frame, arguing for native spirituality and thus for an African 
renaissance. 
Theology of culture shows how religion and culture can be intertwined. 
Philosophy of culture demonstrates that religion can be a sound option also 
within the immanent frame. But how can a dialogue be carried on in a 
society in which there are many religions and worldviews? That is a 
complicated question. I will limit myself to discussing the philosophical 
background that is determinative for religious dialogue in a pluralistic 
society: the shift from a foundationalist epistemology to a “hermeneutics of 
finitude” and a “hermeneutics of suspicion.”          
Plurality and Hermeneutical Reason
Religious dialogue occurs in a pluralistic culture with a plurality of religions 
and secular worldviews. We will now say something more about plurality in 
culture.
At the end of the eighteenth century people slowly began to discover 
the historicity of all cultures and thus cultural differences. Newlands shows, 
among other things, how the World Alliance of Reformed Churches takes the 
issues of cultural context and the problem of inculturation into 
consideration, and Brinkman gives an example of that by means of the image 
of Jesus in Latin America. He shows, as stated above, that the image of 
Jesus is stamped by the culture of Latin America.   
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how should that be valuated? I would like to point to the changed view of 
rationality in support of a positive valuation. Absolute knowledge is no 
longer an option, and that is also true with respect to religious dialogue. The 
differences between the religions can no longer be bridged by rational truth 
as was attempted in the eighteenth century through the notion of natural 
religion. Natural religion was thought to lie at the foundation of revealed 
religions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. That natural religion 
consisted of a rational faith in God, morality, and immortality. The 
differences between all the religions arose, it was held, through what 
revelations added to them. A common unified basis was thus imposed on 
religons, dictated by a reason that every human being was thought to share 
and was independent of historical circumstances. It was not only the 
discovery of the historicity of cultures that placed this concept of reason in 
question. In the philosophy itself―Heidegger played a decisive role 
here―foundationalist empistemology that was related to the general concept 
of reason was criticized and replaced by a broader, hermeneutical concept of 
reason and thus by a hermeneutics of finitude.
Foundationalist epistemology held that the basis for statements was 
self-evident in itself and not subject to correction, as is the case in 
statements like “no circle is square” or “my foot hurts.” But most of our 
statements of knowledge concern matters that are more comprehensive and 
have an aspect of interpretation. Moreover, our knowledge does have a limit, 
as Kant showed. Since Kant, we understand that our knowledge is finite and 
we emphasize the dialogical structure of our knowing. The dilemma of 
absolute knowledge or relativism is not only to be rejected in general but also 
with respect to religion. It is not, as we stated above, a question of everything 
or nothing. The human being is finite and therefore his knowledge and 
insight is also limited in the area of religion. The question of religious truth 
cannot be decided definitively. At present religious dialogue is not conducted
on the basis of a universal reason that yields universal religious truths. That 
whole approach has been unmasked as fiction. Rather, it occurs on the basis 
of hermeneutical reason and a hermeneutics of finitude. We are referred to 
the interpretation of holy books, but we do not have a lease on truth over 
against other holy books―which does not, for that matter, prevent one from 
holding to the truth of one’s beliefs. What the philosopher calls a 
hermeneutics of finitude the theologian call the creatureliness of the human 
being, the human being as a finite, limited being, created by God. 
Aside from a hermeneutics of finitude, we are also referred to a 
“hermeneutics of suspicion.” As human beings, we are not masters of 
ourselves and are often, consciously or unconsciously, driven by self-
interest. Texts and people can maintain unjust situations in hidden or 
visible ways. What philosophy calls a hermeneutics of suspicion theology
calls sin, which is also present in human knowledge (Westphal 2001:177v.)
Paul speaks of people who “suppress the truth by their wickedness” (Romans 
1:18). A religion should therefore be critical of itself and its own tradition.
One remark should still be made here. Conducting a dialogue is not 
only a matter for theological experts who discuss the cognitive insights of 
religion with one another. There are other kinds of dialogue. What was stated 
9above can lead to the impression that, anthropologically speaking, the 
human being is only mind. That would be incorrect, for the human being is 
also body, as I stated above. Religion is not only a matter of the human mind 
and heart but also one of the human body. If one looks at icons in the 
Eastern Orthodox tradition, one sees that evangelists, apostles, and saints 
are often depicted with eyes wide and elongated fingers as a sign that the 
person portrayed is a spiritual human being. The much-read Dutch novel, 
Knielen op een bed violen (Kneeling on a Bed of Violets) by Jan Siebelink, is 
about a group of radical Protestants with a strong sense of sin and a deep 
faith in God. That faith is also visible in their bodies. The main character in 
the novel, Hans Sievez, who himself belongs to this group, and his wife 
Margje are physically repelled by these people because of their deformities 
and strong body odour. Their descriptions lead one to believe that this 
sectarian group is made up of freaks. That religion is also often a matter of 
the body is also present in this volume. 
In her contribution Anbeek discusses the dialogue with Buddhism in 
different forms of dialogue. Apart from the dialogue of experts in religion, of 
which May provides a nice example, she also discusses practical-spiritual 
dialogue in which the body plays a role. One can think here of, for example, 
sitting for a long time in meditation and breathing exercises.    
An example of the above-mentioned hermeneutics of suspicion 
emerges in the dialogue with Judaism (Houtman and Schoon). Houtman
sketches primarily the traditional approach of the church to the Jews and 
Schoon shows that, after Auschwitz, some churches have revised their earlier 
views about the Jews.
This volume also contains a treasuretrove of information on how 
dialogue with other religions is now being conducted. Schouten writes about 
the history of dialogue with Hindus in the Netherlands. Hoekema does the 
same for the dialogue with Islam, whereas Speelman discusses dialogue from 
the perspective of Muslims.
If, in discussing Wethmar and Van Butselaar, I refer to a parallel with 
epistemology, I do not touch the heart of their contributions. Nevertheless, 
the following observation is interesting because we see the extent to which 
church and theology are in step with culture. Wethmar shows in his 
discussion of the ecumenical debate on the church that this initially 
occurred in an atmosphere of the outdated view of reason as universal that 
was thought to be universally valid. It is now recognized that a view of 
church should be less monolithic, and there is more consideration for the 
plurality of views of the church. The current view of the church as a pilgrim 
people acknowledges that the church is still on the way, thus making it 
difficult, it seems to me, for a church to make an absolute claim on truth. 
Here we see a similar shift in the view of the church as that which occurred 
in epistemology as described above. I will remark that such a shift must be 
first of all justified theologically by an appeal to the eschatological character 
of the truth of the Christian faith. Christianity, after all, does live out of the 
promise of the coming of God’s kingdom    
In his contributionVan Butselaar shows that conversion to a certain 
religion is often viewed with scepticism in Europe, in contrast to how it is 
viewed in Africa. Can one of the causes of this be the dominance of a 
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(post)modern climate in Europe? Having an organized worldview, let alone 
being converted to one, is one area in which Christian faith deviates from 
(post)modern culture. Are Christians not ultimately “strangers and pilgrims 
on earth” (Hebrews 11:13)? 
In addition to Wethmar and Van Butselaar, Weinrich also gives an 
example of ecumenical dialogue. He shows the small but significant 
differences between two Protestant traditions, the Lutheran and the 
Reformed, with respect to confession and tradition. He argues that the 
Lutheran view still reflects a medieval view of the church as the Body of 
Christ, of the ideal of a universally visible body of the church, whereas the 
Reformed tradition reflects more a modern striving for an ecumenical 
commitment of different churches, each aiming at the catholicity of a 
universal church.    
The distinction between interreligious dialogue and ecumenism among 
churches has become less clear. The theological discipline of ecumenics is 
increasingly being directed to the interactions between church traditions in a 
global Christianity, and missiology is focusing more on the theology of non-
Western churches, according to Brinkman. Interreligious dialogue has 
become an integral part of ecumenics and missiology. For other reasons as 
well, the distinction between interreligious dialogue and ecumenism has 
become less clear. In this connection I remind the reader that Houtepen
discusses a broader ecumenism beyond the boundaries of the church: the 
Abrahamitic ecumenism of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Gort argues 
that the practical approach to poverty will be successful only in collaboration 
with other world religions, which also promotes ecumenism. 
Crossroad Discourses gives the reader a splendid impression of Christian 
faith in contemporary culture, both with respect to secular culture and other 
religions. It shows how changes in culture, such as secularity, plurality, and 
multiculturalism influence ecumenics and interreligious dialogue. The 
cultural position of the church and the religious attitude of church members 
is thus changing. 
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